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There is no debate amongst economists that Japan performed poorly during the1990s. This can 
be seen in falling growth rates of GDP per capita, investment per capita and mounting problems 
of non performing loans and ballooning Government deficit. A lot of models have tried to come 
up with an explanation for the Lost Decade. However, none of them have yet been able to clearly 
account for the growth slump. At this point, it is necessary to revisit all possible distortions that 
might have caused the dismal performance during the 1990s. This would help us to correctly 
identify the possible problem areas and search for more specific causes of downturn of the 
economy in a considerably narrowed field. In this paper, I have tried to bring together the 
different proposed theories in a consolidated way to help isolate promising theories from not so 
promising ones. To do so, I applied the Business Cycle Accounting procedure developed by V V 
Chari, Ellen R McGrattan and Patrick Kehoe to the Japanese case. I find that efficiency wedge is 
important in explaining the dismal performance of the Japanese economy during the 1990s but 
labor wedge is not very important except for a brief span of time during 1996 to 1997. My most 
important result is that investment wedge played a major role in the performance of the Japanese 
economy during the 1990s. So, any model that tries to focus on what went wrong in Japan in 
1990s would do well to focus on frictions on productivity and investment financing that might be 
at the root of the dismal performance of the Japanese economy. 
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 Introduction 
Japanese economy has performed very well from after the 2nd World War to about the 1980s. 
The average growth rate of the GDP per capita was a stellar 8.09% from 1955 to 1973; it 
stabilized to about 3.02% from 1973 to 1991, which was much more than the average growth 
rate of GDP per capita of 2% in United States. However, in the 1990s the performance of the 
Japanese economy was dismal. The average growth rate of GDP/capita fell to .72%, an all-time 
low since 1955. If we look at the average growth rates of investment during the above periods, 
investment per capita grew at an average rate of 14.06% during 1955 to 1973, then it stabilized at 
2.19% from 1973 to 1991; but the average growth rate of investment fell to -.04% during 1991 to 
2001. Japan’s enviable growth rate till about the late 1980s has attracted much attention. As 
explained by Professor Anne O Krueger in her article “East Asian Experience and Endogenous 
Growth Theory”
1, Japan’s productive capacity was seriously impaired after the 2ndWorldWar. 
Japanese Government used a policy of quantitative restriction on imports and promotion of 
exports to promote production. This policy was gradually liberalized over the years. However, as 
analyzed by Lawrence in 1991, restrictions may have taken the form of industrial organizations 
like the Keiretsu. Also, during the 1980s there is evidence to suggest preferential credit rationing, 
with substantial credit going to exporters. The labor market institutions with strong job 
                                                 
 
1 East Asian Experience and Endogenous Growth Theory published in “Growth Theories in 
Light of the East Asian Experience” edited by Takahasi Ito and Anne O Krueger 
 
  3protection, intensive on-the-job training and enterprise helped Japan to utilize imported 
technology rapidly and successfully. All these policies led to the phenomenal growth rate of 
Japan’s GDP per capita during the recovery period after the 2nd World War till about 1980s.The 
question is what caused the dismal performance of Japanese economy in the 1990s after about 50 
years of exemplary growth? Many theories have been forwarded to explain the Japanese slump 
during the 1990s. The slump has been blamed on inadequate fiscal policy, the over-investment in 
the earlier years resulting in depressed investment later on; and problems of financial 
intermediation. In a recent article
2, Edward Prescott and Fumio Hayashi proposed an alternative 
explanation. They have claimed that the reasons for the downturn in 1990s was not any problems 
of investment financing, but rather slump in total factor productivity and fall in workweek hours. 
In this paper, I shall attempt to explain which factors might have been important in explaining 
the downturn of Japanese economy in 1990s. I shall use the Business Cycle Accounting 
approach
3 developed by V V Chari, Ellen Mcgrattan and Patrick Kehoe to try to account for the 




                                                 
 
2  ‘The 1990s in Japan: A Lost Decade’ –Review of Economic Dynamics, 2002 Volume 5 
 
3 “Business Cycle Accounting” NBER Working Paper No. w 10351, March 2004 
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The plan of the paper is as follows.  
In Section 1, I shall first provide some facts about the Japanese economy before and during the 
downturn in 1990s. 
Section 2 is an exposition on the Business cycle accounting methodology. I provide a summary 
of theoretical equivalence results proposed by V V Chari, Ellen Mcgrattan and Patrick Kehoe.  
In Section 3, I provide a model for Business Cycle Accounting used by me in this paper. 
 
In section 4, I provide the results generated by applying the Business Cycle Accounting 
procedure to the Japanese case. 
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Section 1  
Facts about the Japanese Economy during the ‘Lost Decade’ 
1.1 Poor Performance in the 1990s 
We begin with an examination of the Japanese National Income Accounts data for 1955 to 2001. 
As already stated in the introduction, Japanese economy has performed very well from after the 
2nd World War to about the 1980s. This was evident in the average growth rate of GDP per 
capita which stood at 8.09% from 1955 to 1973; it then fell to about 3.02% from 1973 to 1991. 
This growth rate was still much more than the average growth rate of GDP per capita of 2% in 
United States. However, in the 1990s the performance of the Japanese economy was dismal. The 
average growth rate of GDP/capita fell to .72%, an all-time low since 1955. Another indicator of 
this dismal performance is the average growth rates of investment during the above period. 
 Investment per capita grew at an average rate of 14.06% during 1955 to 1973, then it stabilized 
at 2.19% from 1973 to 1991; but the average growth rate of investment fell to -.04% during 1991 
to 2001. In this scenario, Government tried to keep the pace of the domestic economy by a 
steady expenditure over the periods. Government expenditure stood at an average of 3.3% during 
1955 to 1973; the average rate of growth of per capita government spending then fell to 2.6% 
from 1973 to 1991. During 1991 to 2001, the average rate of growth of per capita government 
spending was 1.6%. Refer to Figure 1 for a graphical exposition of these trends. 
Looking at the above figures, it seems like the Japanese economy was doing very well up to the 
1980s poised to catch up with the United States, but something went wrong in the 1990s. After 
  6maintaining decades of high growth rates, the GDP per adult in 2001 fell to 83.9% of what it 
should have been if the average growth rate of 3.02% during the 1980s could have been 
maintained in 1990s. 
1.2 Workweek falls in 1988-1993 period 
Japan’s strong labor market was credited for its role in the remarkable recovery and high growth 
rate of Japanese economy after the Second World War Aside from the fact that in-the-job 
training and job protection resulted in a skilled labor force, the hours worked per week averaged 
at 44 hours during 1980 to 1992. However, during 1988 to 1993 due to huge support amongst the 
Japanese population, the Labor Standards Law was modified. The new legislation reduced 
workweek from 6 to 5 days a week, it added one day to paid vacation and increased the number 
of national holidays by three. The result of this change in legislation was a fall in average hours 
worked to 40 hours per week during the 1990s. This is what Figure 2 depicts. However, during 
the period of 1980 to 2001, we notice a slight increase in the employment to working population 
(people aged 15-64) ratio from .7 in 1980 to .74 in 2001. This trend is illustrated in Figure 3. 
Hence even though the modified Labor Standards Law did have an effect on the workweek hours, 
the negative impact on overall man hours worked was to some extent reduced due to slight 
increase in employment. 
1.3 Investment per working population in 1990s 
The investment to GDP ratio in Japan has always been higher than in United States. The average 
investment to GDP ratio during 1955 to 1973 stood at .17 in US as opposed to.23 in Japan. 
During 1973 to 1991, the investment to GDP ratio was .17 in US but increased to .29 in Japan. It 
  7remained at .19 in US and .3 in Japan during 1992-2001. So, investment has always been a big 
part of GDP in Japan. But, during the slump of 1990s, investment per working population fell by 
an average of .04%. This has caused some concern and has generated many theories. A majority 
of these theories credit a fall in bank loans as causing the fall in credit availability, which caused 
a fall in investment. Taking a closer look at investment finance done by firms from the period 
1984 to 2000, Prescott and Hayashi are of the view that supply of loans did not decline, as there 
were other sources of finance apart from bank loans that acted as a buffer against the drop in 
bank loans. Alongside this observation, if there was also enough demand for loans for investment, 
then we should see investment growing.  However, data on investment during this period seems 
to suggest the contrary.  
Aggregate investment comprises of three components: investment in Plant & Machinery by 
private sector, investment in dwellings by private sector and investment by public sector. During 
the 1980s in Japan land prices were soaring before it crashed during the 1990s. So, we might 
expect people to anticipate crashing value of investment value of land in future, and thus 
decrease investment in land and dwellings. 
However, if there are ample investment opportunities and no credit crunch, we should see 
enough investment in plant and machinery by private sector. This necessitates a look at 
breakdown of investment to look at what happened? 
Aggregate Investment = Gross Fixed Capital Formation (Plant & Equipment+Dwellings+Public 
investment) +Change in inventories. 
  8The average growth rate of investment in dwellings per working population stood at 1.92% 
(1980:1991) and it fell to -2.1% (1992:2001). The average growth rate of investment in plant & 
equipment per working population stood at 7.05% (1980:1991) and it fell to -.07% (1992:2001). 
This was compensated by the average growth rate of public investment per working population. 
The growth rate was .29% (1980:1991) but it increased to 1.88% (1992:2001). Figure 4 depicts 
the share of investment to GDP by type of investment. 
There seems to be 3 distinct trends in investment. Investment in Plant & Equipment to GDP ratio 
increased from 1980 to 1991, then slumped during 1992 to 2001 except for a brief period of 
increase from 1996 to 1998. 
Investment in dwelling to GDP ratio and Investment in public sector to GDP ratio follow a 
similar trend. They both fell from 1980 to 1985 and grew from 1986 to 1990 and again fell from 
1996 to 2001; except for 1991 to 1996 when Investment in dwelling to GDP ratio falls and 
Investment in public sector to GDP ratio rises, which suggests that when the slump hit the 
economy around 1991-1992, and there was a fall in investment, government increased public 
investment. This suggests that even if supply of funds for investment was not constrained, but 
investment did not take place at the same rate as it had during 1980 to 1991. This opens up the 
possibility that even though supply of funds was not constrained to firms but demand of funds 
for investment by private sector was constrained. In a later paper, we explore the option that if 
firms offer land as collateral to banks to borrow funds for investment, then crashing land prices 
would decrease the value of collateral and thus constrict funds that are available for investment. 
This might explain the fact that even if there are enough investible funds in supply, but collateral 
constraints prevent these funds from being channeled to promising investment projects. 
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  Section 2 
Business Cycle Accounting 
In the paper .Business Cycle Accounting., VV Chari, Ellen R Mcgrattan and 
Patrick Kehoe show that large classes of business cycle models are equivalent to a 
prototype growth model with time-varying wedges that, at least at face value, look 
like time-varying labor taxes, investment taxes and productivity. 
The authors refer to these wedges as labor wedges, investment wedges and 
efficiency wedges. Different theories have been forwarded to explain a fall in 
output during depression: it can be caused by a fall in productivity, which can be 
due to a negative shock to technology or input financing frictions that result in 
movement of inputs to inefficient firms rather than efficient firms. Output can 
also fall if there are increased wedges due to unionization or any other labor 
market frictions that make labor costly. Investment frictions affect output by 
making investment more expensive. In a theoretical exposition, the authors show 
how a model with input financing frictions can be mapped into a model with 
efficiency wedge. The authors also show similar equivalence results between 
models with labor-unions and a growth model with labor taxes; and a model of 
investment frictions (Carlstrom & Fuerst 1997) with a growth model which 
incorporates investment taxes. These equivalence results propose a method of 
accounting for economic fluctuations using a business cycle model with 
  10appropriate taxes incorporated in it. The method is to use a parameterized growth 
model to measure the wedges from the data. The wedges are then fed back into 
the growth model individually and in various combinations to assess what 
fractions of the output movement can be attributed to each wedge separately and 
in different combinations. The goal is to identify what kind of frictions should be 
considered to deliver the quantitatively relevant types of wedges that are observed 
in the prototype growth economy. 
2.1 The Model 
I am using a prototype growth model with time varying efficiency, labor taxes and 
investment taxes to account for the output slowdown of Japan during the 1990s. I 
shall refer to the time varying efficiency as an efficiency wedge; the time varying 
labor tax as a labor wedge and the time varying investment tax as an investment 
wedge. My aim is to identify wedges that can significantly explain the drop in 
GDP per working population in Japan during the 1990s. For details, please refer 
to “Business Cycle Accounting”, VV Chari, Ellen Mcgrattan and Patrick Kehoe. 
This procedure would thus suggest types of models that would be promising in 
explaining the lost decade of Japanese economy in 1990s. For example, if we find 
that investment wedge is relevant in explaining the drop of output per working 
population then we have to look for models that can provide a channel or 
investment friction, the likes of Carlstrom & Fuerst -1997, or Bernanke & Gertler 
- 1989. The prototype economy is a growth model with three stochastic variables: 
the efficiency wedge ; the labor wedge t A nt τ ; the investment wedge xt τ . 
  11The economy every period consists of    identical agents. The representative 
agent chooses per capita consumption ; per capita investment ; per capita 
labor  ; to maximize present discounted value of lifetime utility. 
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where subscript t denotes the time period t,  is the beginning of the period 
capital stock, 
t k
nt τ  is the tax rate on labor income, which we shall refer to as labor 
wedge,  xt τ  is the tax rate on investment, which we shall refer to as the investment 
wedge,   is the wage rate,   is the rental rate on capital,   is the per capita 
transfer from the government. We shall assume that population grows at a 
constant rate of ; and technology grows at a constant rate of   and  the 
depreciation rate of capital stock is
t w t r t Tr
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There is a representative firm in the economy, which produces the final good 
using labor and capital. The firm chooses per capita labor   and per capita capital 
  to maximize profits every period given production technology of the final 
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where   is the time-varying productivity that we shall henceforth call efficiency 
wedge. Notice that if the economy were on a balanced growth path, then   
should be constant over time. Shocks to   would cause output to deviate from its 




I assume that government balances its budget every period, so that 




where   is the per capita government expenditure. I shall further assume that 
government expenditure on goods is wasted every period and does not enter 
representative agent’s utility function. 
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Every period the resource constraint is satisfied: 
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Notice that if there are no wedges, i.e. we set the time varying efficiency wedge to 
a constant value and assume no taxes on labor income or investment expenditure, 
i.e.  nt τ =constant;  xt τ =constant  t ∀ ; then the economy would be on a balanced 
growth path. However, if there are shocks to either the productivity wedge, or any 
labor market friction or investment financing friction, then it would distort the 
margin such that marginal rate of substitution between leisure and consumption 
will diverge from the marginal productivity of labor; and the intertemporal 
marginal rate of substitution of consumption would diverge from the marginal 
productivity of capital; also the output would diverge from the balanced growth 
path output; thus the time-varying efficiency factor   along with the taxes on 
labor income
t A
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2.2 How the model works, the technical and algebraic details: 










  i.e. a variable    discounted by the long term growth rate of technological 
development. 
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Section 3 
Measuring the wedges 
3.1 Data availability 
In my accounting procedure, I use data to estimate the stochastic process for the 
wedges and then measure the realized wedges once the parameters of the 
stochastic process are known. I shall concentrate on the period from 1980 to 2001. 
My assumption is that in 1980 economy is poised to be on a balanced growth path. 
If we look at the growth rate of GDP per working population, it had stabilized to 
about 3.02% during 1973 to 1991.This seems to suggest that Japanese economy 
was poised on a balanced growth path during 1973 to 1991. Throughout I am 
using annual data for Japanese variables in 1995 constant prices in US dollars. I 
have the data on GDP, Gross Fixed Capital Formation (private enterprises and 
public), Net change in inventories (private enterprises and public) Private 
Consumption Expenditure, Government Consumption Expenditure and Net 
Exports. I construct Gross Capital Formation as the sum of Gross Fixed Capital 
Formation (private enterprises and public) and Net change in inventories (private 
enterprises and public). An accounting convention that I follow throughout this 
paper is to include the Government investment in total Investment of the 
economy; and to include net exports to private consumption to give me a measure 
of domestic consumption. We also have data on population by age, employment 
  16and monthly hours of work. The data is available from SourceOECD or Japan 
Statistical Yearbook; and the Japan Population Census. The ILO-LABORSTA 
gives the data on monthly hours worked (these data are adjusted for discrepancies 
in estimates of Labor Force Survey and Establishment Survey).  
Our working population,   =Population aged 15 to 64.   t N
I can therefore calculate the per capita GDP ( ), Gross Capital Formation ( t y t x ), 
Consumption ( ), Government ( ) and Net Exports.  t c t g
The accounting convention I follow is: 
t C  = Private consumption +Net Exports 
t X  = Gross capital formation (private and public enterprises) 
t G = Government Consumption Expenditure. 








= .  We can construct the capital stock series, given t X ; 
and the initial capital stock    by the Perpetual Inventory Method,  0 k
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3.2 Estimating the Stochastic Process for the Wedges 
The first step in my analysis is to estimate the efficiency, labor and investment 
wedge every period from the model equations and the data. So, given the data on 
consumption, labor, capital stock and an estimate of the parameters of the model, 
we can use equations (1)-(4) to estimate the wedges. Equation (1) would give me 
the efficiency wedge series   and Equation (2) would give me the labor wedge 
series
t A
nt τ . It should be noted that investment wedge cannot directly be calculated 
from the given equations because we need to specify expectations over future 
values of consumption, the capital stock, and wedges and so on. The decision 
rules from my model implicitly depend on these expectations and therefore on the 
stochastic process driving the wedges. Thus, the estimated stochastic process is 
important only for measuring the investment wedge. 
We estimate the stochastic process for wedges as follows. We shall assume that 
production function has the form
1 (, 1 ) ( ( 1 ))
t
tt t t t z t AF k l Ak g l
θ θ − −= + ; the utility 
function has the form ( ,1 ) log log(1 ) uc l c l ψ − =+ − . We choose θ  =  .36;  β  
= .972; δ = .089 and ψ = 1:13 (the parameters are from Edward Prescott and 
Fumio Hayashi). The time endowment is taken as 5000 hours annually. 
 
 
  18Using the production function and the utility function specified before, we can 
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We first need to figure out the stochastic process for the wedges. We know the 
data on . So, the government wedge   is taken from the data. We 
can figure out the efficiency wedge   and labor wedge 
,, ttt t ycla n d g t g
t A nt τ from equations 9 and 
10. So, if we can figure out investment wedge  xt τ we can figure out the stochastic 
process for wedges. To do this, we first need a procedure to solve my non-linear 
model. I shall use the Method of Log Linearization suggested by King, Plosser 
and Rebelo (1988)
4. The method involves writing the model equations that solve 
the decision variables, solve for the steady state of the model and log linearizing 
                                                 
 
4 Robert King, Charles Plosser, Sergio Rebelo (1988), “Production, growth, and 
business cycles: The basic neoclassical model”, Journal of Monetary Economics 
21(2), pp. 195-232. 
 
  19the model equations around the steady state. Finally, I shall use the Method of 
Undetermined Coefficients to solve for the decision rules. Notice that given my 
functional form specifications and my model, in the absence of distortionary 
wedges, the economy would be on a balanced growth path with output per capita, 
consumption per capita, investment per capita all growing at the rate of 
technological progress,   and labor would be constant over time. So, to solve for 
a steady state for the model, I need to discount all variables on the balanced 
growth path by their growth rate on the balanced growth path,  . This is what is 
depicted in equations (9) to (12). Then we can get the steady state values of the 
variables by solving equations (13) to (16). The first step is to find the steady state 
values of the wedges. I shall choose the initial condition for the wedges such that 
in the starting year, one that I choose to be 1980, the economy would be on a 
balanced growth path, at its observed initial value for consumption, investment, 
government consumption, capital stock and employment. Hence the 1980 values 
of   detrended by the growth rate of technology,   are taken as the 
steady state values of these variables. Given these steady state values, we can 
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Now, we can log-linearize the system of equations (9)-(12) around the steady 
state values of the variables, which we get from equations (13) to (16). 
Log-linearizing the set of equations (9)-(12) around steady state we get: 
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To measure the investment wedge, I need to specify a stochastic process as 
already discussed earlier. 
Let us denote . Let us specify a vector AR1 process for the 
log-linearized wedges: 
,, {, , ,} tt n t x t t sA g ττ =   
10 tt sP P s Q ε ++ =+ +    
  21I assume that the errors follow a lognormal distribution. Further, I assume the 
errors to be contemporaneously correlated across equations but identically and 
independently distributed across time. 
I shall use the Method of Undetermined Coefficients along with the equations 
(17)-(20) and the stochastic process for the wedges to estimate the decision rules: 
   
11 tt t t ++
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3.3 Estimating the investment wedge 
For an initial estimate, we write the equations (13) to (16) in a state-space model. 
Doing this allows us to use the Kalman Filter algorithm to get an initial estimate 
of the parameters of the stochastic process. Then we use the state series i.e. the 
predicted investment wedge series, generated by the Kalman Filter, and the other 
wedges that we estimated directly from our model equations and estimate the 
initial parameters  of the stochastic process by the SVAR method. 
Now, using the parameters of the stochastic process thus estimated and the log-
linear equations (17) to (20), we can estimate the decision rules for the control 
variables. We can then use the decision rules thus estimated and the data to update 
our investment wedge series. That is, we let investment wedge be whatever it has 
01 , P P and Q
  22to be so that the decision rule for income generate the data. Now, using the new 
investment wedge series along with the other wedge series we estimate 
parameters of the stochastic process again; we repeat the steps till model 
simulations match the data for the decision variables. 
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Section 4 
Decomposition 
Our accounting procedure decomposes movements in variables from an initial 
date with an initial capital stock into four components consisting of movements 
driven by each of the four wedges away from their values at the initial date. We 
construct these components as follows. Define the efficiency component of the 
wedges by setting . So,   is the vector of wedges in 
which in period t, the efficiency wedge takes on its period t value while the other 
wedges stay at their initial i.e. year 1980 value. We can define the other 
components analogously. Thus, using   and the initial 
period capital stock, , we can generate the capital stock series by 
where    is the estimated decision rule of the capital 
stock next period. Then, using the vector of wedges,  , 
the estimated capital stock series and the decision rules estimated, we can get the 
movements in the decision variables due to the efficiency component only. 
1 ,1980 ,1980 1980 {, , , } tt n x sA g ττ =     1t s 
1 ,1980 ,1980 1980 {, , , } tt n x sA g ττ =    
1980 k
11 1 (,) tt t kk s k ++ =    t 
11 (,) tt t ks k +  
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We can analogously get movements in decision variables due to other 
components like labor or investment wedge, also in different combinations of the 
wedges. For example, we can define efficiency and labor component as: 
  . Then using   and  the 
decision rules estimated, we could get the movements in the decision variables 
due to the efficiency and labor component only. 
2 , ,1980 1980 {, , , } tt n t x sA g ττ =     2 , ,1980 1980 {, , , } tt n t x sA g ττ =    





























5 For more details, see the technical appendix that is available upon request. 
  254.1  
Accounting Findings 
4.1.1 Trends in output per capita, investment per capita and labor  
(as observed in data) 
In Figure 5 we plot the decision variables as observed in the data to observe their 
trends. We find that output per capita (detrended at 2%) rises by 12.68% from 
1980 to 1991 but falls by 4.39% from 1991 to 1995. It rises briefly by 1.21% 
during 1995 to 1997 but again falls by 5.59% during 1997 to 2001. 
Investment per capita (detrended at 2%) turns out to be more volatile than output 
per capita (detrended at 2%). It rises by 26.75% during 1980 to 1991. It falls by 
14.4% from 1991 to 1995 then rises by 4.27% during 1995 to 1997 only to fall by 
13.35% during 1997 to 2001. 
During the same span of time, labor also shows similar trend. It rises by .013% 
during 1980 to 2001 but then falls by 4.39% during 1991 to 1995. It rises by .96% 
during 1995 to 1997 but then falls again by 4.02% during 1997 to 2001. 
Our aim is to see which component, efficiency, labor or investment can best 
replicate this trend when inserted into our model individually, or in different 
combinations. 
 
  264.1.2 Output per capita and estimated wedges 
In Figure 6 we plot the estimated wedges during the period 1980 to 2001. During 
the same period, efficiency wedge rises by 1.24% from 1980 to 1991 but falls by 
4.75% during 1991 to 1995. It continues to fall by .26% during 1995 to 1997 and 
by 3.62% during 1997 to 2001. We also find tax on labor income rises by 3.98% 
during 1980 to 1991 and it again rises by 2.12% during 1991 to 1995 and 3.59% 
during 1997 to 2001 except for a small decline by .1% during 1995 to 1997. Tax 
on investment also follows a similar trend. It falls by 25.86% during 1980 to 1991. 
It then rises by 11.24% by 1991 to 1995; then it rises by 4.06% during 1995 to 
1997 and again rises by 10.05% during 1997 to 2001. As opposed to this trend, 
government spending rises throughout. It rises by 7.01% during 1980 to 1991; by 
4.52% during 1991 to 1995; by .12% during 1995 to 1997 and by 6.99% during 
1997 to 2001. Thus, just by the pattern of the wedges, it seems suggestive that 
efficiency, labor as well as investment wedge had a role to play in the trend in 
output. It would be instructive to inject the wedges one by one and in various 





  274.1.3 Estimated Output per capita by feeding the wedges one at a time in our 
model 
(How well do they compare to data?) 
 In Figure 7 we plot output per capita from data detrended at 2% ( ). Also, we 
plot the output per capita that we get from the model with efficiency, labor and 
investment wedge, each put in the model one at a time. If we put only efficiency 
wedge in, with other wedges fixed at their 1980 level, we see efficiency wedge 
can explain 7.48% of the increase in output per capita during 1980 to 1991; it can 
explain 75.17% of the drop during 1991 to 1995 and 41.87% of the drop during 
1997 to 2001. However, during 1995 to 1997, it suggests a drop in output by -
.12% as opposed to an increase in output per capita as evidenced from data. 
t y ˆ
Investment wedge, with other wedges fixed at their 1980 level, explains 79.5% of 
increase in output during 1980 to 1991. It explains 19.82% of the drop in output 
per capita during 1991 to 1995; it would also explain 102.71% increase during 
1995 to 1997 and 39.57% of the fall during 1997 to 2001. 
Labor wedge, put in the model by itself produces some interesting result; It 
suggests a drop in output per capita by .67% during 1980 to 1991; and an increase 
by .07% during 1991 to 1995; it however can explain 22.03% of the increase of 
output per capita during 1995 to 1997 and 5.36% of the fall in output per capita 
during 1997 to 2001. 
  28Looking at how these wedges perform individually, we find that efficiency and 
investment wedge out perform the labor wedge. The labor wedge gives us 
opposite trends from what is observed in the data from 1980 to 1995. It does not 
explain much of the data except for a brief period of 1996 to 1997. However, the 
investment and efficiency wedge generate output per capita that closely follows 
the trend in the data, though they tend to overestimate or in majority of cases 
underestimate the output per capita as opposed to the data. However, it is yet too 
soon to conclude that efficiency and investment wedge in unison are the ones we 
should focus upon. 
To conclude that one wedge is more important than another, it is important to 
look at other decision variables and how the wedges perform with respect to 
predicting the other variables, when put one at a time in the model. I shall look at 
labor ( ) and investment per capita (detrended at 2%) ( ).  t l t x ˆ
4.2 Estimated investment per capita by feeding the wedges one at a time in 
our model 
(How well do they compare to data?) 
 In figure 8 we plot investment per capita from data (detrended at 2%) ( ). Also, 
we plot the investment per capita that we get from the model with efficiency, 
labor and investment wedge, each put in the model one at a time. 
t x ˆ
If we put only efficiency wedge in, with other wedges fixed at their 1980 level, 
we see efficiency wedge suggests a -1.2% drop in investment per capita during 
  291980 to 1991; it also suggests 3.55% increase during 1991 to 1995 and .03% drop 
during 1995 to 1997. However, during 1997 to 2001, it suggests an increase in 
investment per capita by .88% .The trend of investment per capita as suggested by 
data is quite the opposite. 
Investment wedge, with other wedges fixed at their 1980 level, suggests a 61.67% 
increase in investment per capita during 1980 to 1991; it also suggests 20.5% drop 
in investment during 1991 to 1995; it also suggests 7.65% increase in investment 
per capita during 1995 to 1997; and a 12.1% drop during 1997 to 2001. So, 
investment per capita (detrended at 2%) generated by the model by putting just 
investment wedge in the model is more volatile than the investment per capita 
from data.  
At the same time, if we just put labor wedge in the model by holding all other 
wedges at their 1980 level, we find that labor wedge suggests a 7.17% increase in 
investment per capita during 1980 to 1991.The trend becomes opposite to that 
suggested by data from 1991. It suggests a 2.3% increase during 1991 to 1995; 
a .97% drop during 1995 to 1997 and an increase by 3.85% during 1997 to 2001. 
So, as far as investment per capita is concerned, investment wedge seems to 
perform the best as far as generating investment per capita from model closest to 
the data is concerned 
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4.2.1 Estimated labor by feeding the wedges one at a time in our model 
(How well do they compare to data?)  
Our model does not do well as far as labor is concerned. During 1980 to 1991, 
data suggests an increase in labor by .013%, efficiency wedge alone suggests a 
drop by .69%, labor wedge alone suggests a drop by 3.36% whereas investment 
wedge alone suggests an increase in labor by 4.38%. However, the picture is even 
worse from 1991 onwards. Whereas data suggests a drop in labor by 2.48% 
during 1991 to 2001, efficiency wedge suggests an increase by 1.36% during 
1991 to 2001; labor wedge suggests an increase by 3.68% during 1991 to 2001; 
and investment wedge suggests an increase in labor by 2.5% during 1991 to 2001. 
This is what is depicted in Figure 9. 
4.2.2 Summary 
We have inserted all our wedges one at a time into our model. We have thus 
estimated each of the decision variables using one wedge at a time in our model 
and holding other wedges constant at their 1980 values. So now we are in a 
position to evaluate how each component (efficiency wedge, labor wedge and 
investment wedge) performs in generating decision rules as close as possible to 
data. 
  31We can conclude that even though the model does not perform very well as far as 
labor is concerned, it does pretty well as far as output per capita and investment 
per capita is concerned. The labor wedge does not look very promising as far as 
predicting output per capita, labor or investment per capita is concerned. However, 
the efficiency and investment wedge seems more promising. So, the next step 
would be to include efficiency and investment wedge in the model and hold labor 
wedge at 1980 level to see how well efficiency and investment wedge in unison 
explain the pattern of movement in output per capita (detrended at 2%), 
investment per capita (detrended at 2%) and labor from 1980 onwards. 
4.3 Accounting Findings  
(Including efficiency and investment wedge in unison in our model holding 
labor wedge fixed at 1980 value) 
Suppose now we include the efficiency and investment wedge in the model and 
hold the labor wedge at its 1980 level. We would like to see how well the model 
predicts the data. 
4.3.1 Estimated Output per capita  
(Including efficiency and investment wedge in unison in our model holding 
labor wedge fixed at 1980 value) 
How well do they compare to data? Our model which includes the efficiency and 
investment wedge does very well as far as output per capita is concerned. Refer to 
  32Figure 10. During 1980 to 1991, the model can explain 87.77% of the increase in 
output per capita; it also explains 94.3% of the drop in output per capita during 
1991 to 1995; 93% of the increase in output per capita during 1995 to 1997 and 
80.52% of the drop in output during 1997 to 2001. 
4.3.2 Estimated Investment per capita and labor  
(Including efficiency and investment wedge in unison in our model holding 
labor wedge fixed at 1980 value) 
How well do they compare to data? Now we would like to see how a model with 
efficiency and investment wedge perform on the other decision variables, namely, 
investment per capita (detrended at 2%) and labor. Refer to Figure 11 for 
investment per capita and Figure 12 for labor. 
The model does moderately well with investment per capita (detrended at 2%) 
albeit it overestimates the trend in investment per capita. During 1980 to 1991, 
data shows an increase in investment per capita by 26.75% whereas model 
predicts an increase by 60.36%; similarly, during 1991 to 1995, data shows a 
decrease in investment per capita by 14.4% whereas model predicts a decrease by 
18.03%; during 1995 to 1997, investment per capita increases by 4.27% but data 
predicts an increase by 7.55%; finally during 1997 to 2001, investment per capita 
falls by 13.35% whereas model suggests a fall by 11.15%; 
Model, however, does not perform well when we look at labor. Data suggests an 
increase by .013% in labor during 1980 to 1991, but model predicts a 5.7% 
  33increase; during 1991 to 1995, data suggests a fall by 4.39% in labor but model 
predicts a fall in labor by 2.19%; situation is similar during 1995 to 1997, data 
suggests an increase in labor by .96% but model predicts an increase by 1.03% 
and during 1997 to 2001, data suggests a fall in labor by 4.02% but model 
predicts a fall in labor by 1.13%. 
Conclusion 
There is no debate amongst economists that Japan performed poorly during the 
1990s. In fact when we compare Japan’s performance since the reconstruction 
period after the Second World War to about 1991, the performance of the 
economy since 1992 seems even more startling in contrast. This earned 1990s the 
name of a “Lost Decade” when referred to in the context of the performance of 
the Japanese economy. 
However, debates rule the day when trying to explain what went wrong during the 
1990s in Japan. A lot of models have come up trying to explain the fall in growth 
rate of output per capita during the 1990s in Japan. Explanations range from 
financial system’s insulating decisions about capital allocation from market 
signals that caused the input financing frictions to fall in bank profitability due to 
non performing loans to Japan reaching the technological frontier so that it can no 
longer use its legendary power of efficient imitation of technology at a cheap cost. 
Dr. Hayashi and Dr. Prescott have explored along with the role played by shocks 
to productive efficiency, the role of the Labor Standards Law that restricted the 
  34workweek length of labor, maybe another important cause of drop in output if you 
consider a nation of workaholics like Japan. 
In this paper, I have tried to bring together the different factors that may have an 
effect on the economy in a consolidated model. The idea stems from the works of 
Dr. V V Chari, Dr. Ellen R Mcgrattan and Dr. Patrick Kehoe. They show that 
different types of frictions in an economy can be replicated in a growth model 
with time-varying productivity, labor tax and investment financing tax. Then, it is 
a simple accounting procedure to see which wedge or wedges in combination 
seems to be most promising in generating decision rules that can closely replicate 
the data. The advantage is that in a consolidated way, you can at least isolate 
promising areas from not so promising ones. I applied the same procedure to the 
Japanese case. I found that efficiency wedge is important in explaining the dismal 
performance of the Japanese economy during the 1990s. 
This result further supports the conclusions reached by Dr. Hayashi and Dr. 
Prescott. However, my result also suggests that labor wedge is not very important 
except for a brief span of time during 1996 to 1997. 
My most important result is that investment wedge seems to have played a major 
role in the performance of the Japanese economy during the 1990s. It does well in 
replicating the output per capita as well as investment per capita suggested by 
data. So, ignoring investment wedge when trying to explain what went wrong in 
Japan in 1990s would be a serious flaw. 
  35In conclusion, any model that tries to focus on what went wrong in Japan in 1990s 
would do well to focus on frictions on productivity and investment financing that 
caused the dismal performance of the Japanese economy in the 1990s. 
In future research, I hope to explore this path. 
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